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There is a story of an opera singer 
who, after years of appearances in small 
theatres, \vas asked to play the part of 
Calaf in Puccini's TtirunJof at La Scala. His 
performance of 'Nessun dorma' was 
greeted by great cries of 'Encore!' 
Flattered, he repeated the aria. Again the 
cries of 'Encore!' rang out and again heo o
repeated the aria. This continued for 
some time until at last he cried, 'Enough! 
We must continue with the opera!'   
whereupon an old man in the stalls said, 
'No. Tfbu will do it again. And again. And 
again   until you do it right.'
Some may think that a similar 
approach has been taken in some of our 
higher profile criminal cases. Our better 
known appeals have, it could be argued, 
asked our legal system to re-examine 
cases, sometimes again and again, until 
they got it right. Although over 10 years 
have now passed since the overturning of 
the convictions of the Guildford Four, the 
Maguire Seven and the Birmingham Six, 
these arguably remain the cases that most 
swiftly come to mind, at least in England, 
when the phrase 'miscarriages of justice' 
is mentioned. Certain lessons have been 
learned, however, from those and other 
cases and the purpose of this article is 
therefore to look at the changes that have 
come about since the Guildford Four 
were released in 1989, in particular 
concerning the bringing of an appeal 
based on new evidence.
It is worth stating in passing that in 
strict legal terms, as opposed to
procedure, the law of both England & 
Wales and Northern Ireland contains 
very few actual offences of terrorism. 
(Although the system set out in this paper 
applies to both these jurisdictions, it does 
not apply to Scotland.) Some do exist, 
notably membership of a proscribed 
organisation and concealing funds which 
are to be used for, or which derive from, 
acts of terrorism (a particular variety of 
money laundering), but the acts which 
are the subject of high profile cases, i.e. 
preparing, planting and detonating 
bombs, are dealt with as ordinary 
criminal offences. Where victims are 
killed, a charge of murder will be
' O
preferred; another offence commonly 
charged is that of doing an act, or 
conspiring to do so, to cause an explosion 
under s. 3 of the Exp/ome $u6ifunce.$ Acf 
1883, an offence covering equally the 
terrorist and the sole bomber of 
minorities. In Northern Ireland (but not 
in England & Wales), there is the 
difference that terrorist cases are heard 
by a judge without a jury, but the legal 
process involved in an appeal is precisely 
the same as that for any criminal 
conviction.
NEW EVIDENCE
That new e\idence may constitute a 
ground of appeal is not new. Section 2 3 
of the Criming /Ippcd/ /Icf 1968 ('the Act') 
entitles the Court of Appeal to consider 
any e\idence that it sees fit, although the 
court is required, under s. 23(2), to have 
regard to whether:
(1) the evidence appears credible;
(2) it appears that the evidence mav 
afford anv ground for allowing the
^ o o
appeal;
(3) the evidence would have been 
admissible at the trial; and
(4) there is a reasonable explanation for 
the failure to adduce the evidence at 
trial.
The first three are a matter of common 
sense. The new e\idence must clearly be 
believable and also relevant to the appeal,
while the third criterion merely 
underlines the point that the general 
rules of evidence that pertain to a 
criminal trial at first instance apply also to 
an appeal. The fourth is perhaps more 
significant. In general, the evidence in 
question must have arisen, or at least 
come into the possession of the defence, 
since the original trial. The principle is 
that the defence is expected, during the 
trial, to conduct its case as competently 
and thoroughly as possible and Court of 
Appeal will therefore not be sympathetic 
to a request to introduce evidence that 
the defence simply omitted to mention 
earlier. It may, however, agree to hear it 
on the grounds that it shows that the 
conviction is unsafe: th^ incompetence of 
counsel (or the instructing solicitors) 
should not be permitted to cause a 
continued miscarriage of justice. The 
court will, however, in such cases issue a 
very stern reprimand to the legal 
representatives, particularly counsel, 
concerned.
In most cases, however, the reason is 
that the evidence has only subsequently 
come to light. An example of this is the 
case of A r/lMmu/M [1992J 4 All ER 889. 
Kiranjit Ahluwahlia had suffered severe 
and repeated violence and humiliation at 
the hands of her husband of a period of 
some considerable time. She therefore 
poured petrol into his bedroom while he 
was asleep and set light to it, with the 
result that he burned to death. At her 
trial for murder, she raised two lines of 
defence. The first was that she had not 
intended either to kill her husband or to 
cause him very serious bodily harm. The 
jury, perhaps wondering what she 
thought would result from her husband 
being covered in burning petrol, rejected 
this. Her second line of defence was that 
of provocation, that the sustained abuse 
had provoked her into what she had 
done. This, too, was rejected, although it 
was upheld on appeal.
At her appeal, Mrs Ahluwahlia 
introduced a third line of defence, which 
had not been advanced at her trial: that she 
was, at the time she killed her husband,
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suffering from diminished responsibility. 
In other words, her psychological state was 
disturbed and she could therefore not be 
held responsible for her actions. In 
support of this claim, she produced a 
number of psychiatric reports. None of 
these reports had been offered at her trial; 
nonetheless, the Court of Appeal decided 
to admit them. They held that there may 
well have been an arguable defence which, 
for reasons that were unexplained, had not 
been presented at trial. The conviction 
was therefore unsafe and unsatisfactory 
and a retrial was ordered, at which she was 
acquitted.
The defendant is only able to produce 
such evidence, however, if he or she is 
granted leave to appeal: there is no 
automatic right of appeal from the 
Crown Court. (In some cases, the trial 
judge may grant a certificate that the case 
is fit for appeal, but this is rare.)
The question therefore arises: if leave 
to appeal is refused and new evidence 
then comes to light, what remedy is then 
available? This, of course, was the 
position in the Gui/JjorJ four and 
&rmin^ynam Sly cases. In the Gui/d^ord" /"bur 
case, the e\idence was that of an alibi 
which, it was suggested, had been
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concealed by the police. Whether or not 
it was deliberately concealed, it was 
certainly not disclosed to the defence. In 
that of the ^irmim^nam Six, the evidence 
was more technical. In essence, the basis 
of the prosecution case was that traces of 
the explosive nitro-glycerine had been 
found on the defendants' hands, 
suggesting that they had prepared a 
bomb. It subsequently emerged, 
however, that small amounts of nitro- 
glycerine are (or at any rate were in the 
mid-1970s) used in the manufacture of 
the gloss with which playing cards are 
coated. Tests conducted on the hands of 
those taking part in them before and after 
they played a few hands with these cards 
showed similar traces of nitro-glycerine 
to those found on the hands of the 
Birmingham Six.
In such cases, the state may itself 
intervene. Until recently, the procedure 
was that the evidence was presented to 
the Home Secretary. He considered it 
and, if he was suitably persuaded, 
referred the case to the Court of Appeal. 
Upon such a reference, the court was 
obliged to hear the case. This svstem had,
O v
however, obvious flaws. It was considered
by many to be unsatisfactory that the 
decision whether or not a case should be 
referred to the Court of Appeal should be 
taken by a politician. Politicians, of 
whatever party, are inevitably influenced 
by considerations other than purely legal 
ones, not least when an election is 
approaching. It is generallv recognised, 
for example, that Michael Dukakis' 
campaign in the US presidential election 
of 1988 was substantially damaged by the 
explicit reference in Republican Parts 
broadcasts to his decision as Governor of 
Massachusetts to release a convicted 
murderer. In the UK, similar issues arise 
in relation to the release of those serving 
a life sentence for murder, a decision 
taken by the Home Secretary. The 
raising, for example, of the question 
whether Myra Hindley should now be 
released has invariably resulted in her 
victims' bereaved relatives, some now 
quite elderly, appearing to express their 
outrage on national television.
Furthermore, the Home Secretary 
need not, of course, have any legal 
qualification or training whatsoever. A 
number of past holders of the post have, 
in fact, been qualified lawyers of some 
considerable note, but this has bv no 
means always been the case. Finally, the 
suggestion has been made, whether or
CO
not with justification, that party politics 
have on occasion played a role, not least 
in relation to IRA cases. The view has 
never been dispelled in the Gui/dyord" four, 
Eirmin^nam Six and vWa^uire Seven cases 
that the Home Secretary repeatedly 
refused leave to appeal, despite cogent 
defence evidence, simplv because the 
government did not wish to see Irish
o
republicans, once in jail, released. It was 
also suggested that the Conservative 
Government also did not wish to see the 
police undermined.
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW 
COMMISSION
In relation to the discretion to release 
those serving life sentences, the debate 
continues. In relation to the reference of 
cases to the Court of Appeal, however, the 
position was changed by the 1995 Act, 
which abolishes such references by the 
Home Secretarv and transfers this role to 
the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 
which is set up for the purpose.
The Commission's membership is set 
out in s. 8 of the Act. It consists of at least
1 1 members, who are appointed 
indirectly by the prime minister. This 
does not mean, however, that it is any 
sense an agent of the state. This is made 
explicitly clear in s. 8(2):
'Tne Commission sna// nor be re^yarJed* us 
fne senanf or a^yenf oy^ (Ac Croun or as 
enjoying any sfafus, immunity or prici/eac o/ 
fne Croim; and" fne Commission s property 
sna/7 nof be re^arJed" us properly oy\ or ne/d" 
on bena/^o^, fne Cronn.'
To what extent a body may be regarded 
as hilly independent of the state when all 
its members are appointed by the prime 
minister is, of course, an interesting 
question. The risk of compromise is, 
however, somewhat reduced bv the 
members having fixed terms of office. An 
incoming prime minister will therefore 
find that the Commission contains 
persons appointed by his predecessor 
who will continue to serve for some 
years. Although the terms are of up to 
five years only (renewable for up to a 
further five), a comparison may, 
therefore, be drawn with the judges of 
the US Supreme Court.
At least one third of its members must 
have been a barrister or solicitor, either 
in England & Wales or in Northern 
Ireland, for at least 10 vears, onlv one 
year less than the seniority requirement 
for a judge. At least two-thirds must have 
some knowledge of the criminal justice 
system. The hill experience criteria are 
set out in s. 8(6):
'/If /east fwo-fbiras o^fne members o^fne 
Commission sna/7 be persons wno appear fo 
fne Prime .Minister fo nacc ^nouVed^ye or 
experience oj any aspect oj fne criminal justice 
system and" oy^tnem at Jeasf one sna/7 be a 
person nno appears fo nim to bare ^nou/eJae 
or experience o^any aspect oj fne criminal 
Justice system in TVorfnern /re/and"; ana" jor fne 
purposes o^ tnis subsection fne crimina/ justice 
system includes, in particu/ar, fne 
investigation o^o^ences ana" tne treatment oy* 
o^end'ers.'
The Commission's principal role is to 
refer cases to the Court of Appeal. This it 
does in respect not only of actual 
convictions, but any finding that the 
defendant committed the act, even if not 
the offence, with which he was charged. 
These will include verdicts of not guilts 
by reason of insanity (quite rare), the 
rather more common verdict of guilty of 
manslaughter (as opposed to murder) on
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grounds of diminished responsibility, as 
well as any conviction of an alternative 
offence to the one charged. For example, 
a person may be charged with causing 
grievous bodily harm with intent, the 
details being that he is accused of waiting 
tor the victim outside a bar and severely 
beating him up when he came out. He 
denies any involvement and says that, it   
as appears to be the case   the victim was 
beaten up outside the bar, someone else 
must have done it. The jury find that the 
defendant did attack him, but that he did 
not intend to injure him as seriously as he 
did. They therefore find him not guilty   
not of occasioning grievous bodily harm 
with intent, but of the lesser offence of 
occasioning grievous bodily harm or 
possibly even, if they are not satisfied that 
the injuries were really serious, merely of 
actual bodily harm. Provided that the 
specified conditions are met, this 
alternative conviction may also be the 
subject of a reference by the Commission.
In addition, the Commission may refer 
the sentence imposed to the Court of 
Appeal, whether or not it refers the 
actual conviction (s. 9(l)(b) for 
convictions in England & Wales, s.o '
10(l)(b) for convictions in Northern 
Ireland). A reference of a conviction, 
however, always includes a reference of 
the sentence as well unless 'the sentence 
is fixed by law'. At present, this means a 
life sentence in a murder case, but it may 
be seen that it will also apply to any 
minimum or fixed sentence that may be 
introduced in the future. Examples will 
include mandatory life sentences (and 
also, arguably, other minimum sentences) 
under the Crime (Sentences,) /let 1997 or a 
mandatory ban under the footoa/7 
Spectator; /let 1989 on attending matches 
in the event of a conviction for an offence 
of violence or relating to public order ino *
connection with football.
The procedure frequently starts with 
an application by, or on behalf of, the 
accused. Section 14(1) of the Act makes 
clear, however, that such an application is 
not necessary:
'/I reference of a conWction, yerd"ict, j 
or sentence may 6e made . . . eitner ajter an 
app/ication nas been made 6y or on 6ena7f of 
tne person to tvnom it rebates or wifnout an 
app/icafion narin^y 6een so mad"e. '
Where an application is made, it is a 
factor to be considered by the 
Commision in deciding whether or not
to make a reference, as are 'any other 
representations made to the Commission 
in relation to it* (s. 14(2)(b)) and 'any 
other matters which appear to the 
Commission to be relevant' (s. 14(2)(c)). 
On the basis of these, it must then decide 
whether the conditions for making a 
reference, set out in s. 13(1), are met. 
These are that:
(1) the Commission considers that 
there is a real possibility that the 
conviction or other finding would 
not be upheld if the reference were 
made; and
(2) the basis for this view is an 
argument or evidence which was 
raised neither at the trial nor in any 
appeal or application for leave to 
appeal.
Where the sentence is referred, the 
prospect of success must be based on an 
argument or point of law that was not 
raised at an earlier stage. Finally, an 
appeal must already have been 
determined or an application for leave to 
appeal refused.
It may be seen, however, that some 
cases may not neatly fit these criteria. 
The Act therefore contains a catch-all 
provision in s. 13(2):
'Notnin^ in subsections (V)(6)fi,J or (c) 
sna/7 pretent fne ma^in^ of a reference i^ it 
appears to fne Commission fnaf tnere are 
exceptional circumstances trnicn justify ma^in^ 
it.'
As stated earlier, once the Commission 
has made a reference, the Court of 
Appeal must hear the case. This is, 
however, all that is required: the Court is 
to view the reference just as though it 
were an appeal (brought, of course, with 
leave) by the defendant. The final 
decision rests with the Court of Appeal.
In addition to its role of referring caseso
to the Court of Appeal, the Commission 
has powers of investigation. These are 
exercised at the behest of the Court of 
Appeal. The court, under s. 23A(1) of the 
Crimina/ /Ippea/ Art 1968, in the case of 
England & Wales, and s. 25A(1) of the 
Crimina/ylppea/ (Wortnern Jre/and") /let 1980 
in the case of Northern Ireland, may 
direct the Commission to investigate any 
matter that the court thinks relevant to 
the determination of a case if it believes 
that:
* an investigation by the Commission 
will help resolve the matter; and
* the matter is unlikely to be resolved 
without such an investigation.
The significance of this cannot be 
overstated. The defendant, and even his 
legal advisors, often do not have the 
resources to discover all the relevant 
facts, while the prosecution and law 
enforcement agencies would not appear 
to have a strong vested interest in 
continuing to pursue an investigation 
themselves once a person has been 
convicted and the crime is 'solved'. 
Moreover, a law firm, let alone a 
defendants' friends and family, does not 
have the powers to compel co-operation 
that are given to the Commission.
Once the direction is given, the 
Commission conducts the investigation 
in such manner as it sees fit, although it is^ o
required to keep the Court of Appeal 
informed of progress. If^ in the course of 
its investigation, it decides to investigate a 
related matter, it may do so, although 
this, too, must be reported to the Court 
of Appeal.
In pursuit of an investigation, the 
Commission is empowered under s. 17 
of the Criminal Appea/Act 1995 ('the 1995 
Act') to require any 'person serving in a 
public body' in 'possession or control of 
a document or other material which may 
assist the Commission in the exercise of 
any of their functions' to produce the 
document or material or allow the 
Commission access to it. The 
Commission may also direct that the 
material is not to be damaged or 
destroyed. Section 17(4) makes clear that 
the duty of secrecy or confidentiality is 
no bar to complying with a Commission 
investigation:
'Tne d"ufy to comp/y witA a requirement 
unJer fnis section is not averted" 6y any 
o67i^ation of secrecy or otner /imitation on 
dVsc/osure (inc/uaina any sucn oblation or 
/imitation imposed* 6y or 6y yirtue of an 
enactment) wnicn wou/d" otherwise present tne 
production of fne document or otner material 
to tne Commission or rne j/inn^ of access to it 
to tne Commission.'
The Commission is also entitled, 
under s. 19 of the 1995 Act, to appoint 
investigating officers to carry out its 
enquiries. These may be drawn from the 
public body that originally investigated 
the offence or from any police force. It 
sometimes happens, however, as in the 
Gui/d^ord" four case, that certain officers 
are suspected, or at least accused, of
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tampering with or concealing evidence. 
To guard against this, the section goes on 
to empower the Commission specifically 
to preclude a particular person, public 
body or police force from supplying the 
investigating officers.
o o
The Criminal Cases Review 
Commission has, of course, only been in 
existence for a relatively short time. It 
may, therefore, be considered too early to 
judge its success. It has in that time, 
however, achieved two notable successes, 
both particularly remarkable for the 
length of time that the defendants had 
spent in jail. Readers may recall that the 
Guildford Four were in prison for 15 
years, while the Birmingham Six were in 
prison for 17 years. In 1997, the case of 
Paul Andrews was referred by the 
Commission to the Court of Appeal after 
he had been imprisoned for 25 years. 
Andrews, a soldier at the time of his 
arrest, had been convicted of the murder 
of a 14-year-old girl. He had steadfastly 
maintained his innocence, claiming that 
he had never even met the victim. Such 
continued denial of guilt invariably leads 
in the UK to ongoing imprisonment 
since it is a condition of the prisoner 
being considered to be rehabilitated and 
fit to be returned to the community that 
he accept what he has done and show 
suitable regret and remorse. Following 
the Commission's reference of the case, 
Andrews' innocerfce was finally upheld by 
the Court of Appeal and he was released. 
He remains the longest-serving prisoner 
in a miscarriage of justice case.
The second longest, Paddy Nicholls, 
was released on bail in March 1998 
pending his appeal and his conviction was 
quashed on 12 June 1998. He had served 
23 years in jail, although an admission of 
guilt might well have resulted in release 
10 years earlier. Nicholls, then 46, was 
convicted of the murder of an elderly 
woman, a friend of his, who was found 
dead at the foot of the stairs in her flat 
following a heart attack. Two prominent 
pathologists (one of whom was later 
involved in the autopsy on Rudolf Hess) 
gave evidence for the prosecution to the 
effect that the woman had been badly 
beaten and then suffocated, a view based 
on marks to her face. The shock and 
violence of the attack had, it was said, led 
to the heart attack from which the 
woman actually died. Further evidence 
adduced by the prosecution was that 
Nicholls, who in fact it was who found
the woman's body, had lied to the police, 
denying having been at her flat on the day 
of her death. This lie he admitted in 
court, saying that he was afraid of the 
police, having been beaten up by them a 
week earlier, and therefore wished to 
distance himself from the scene.
In addition to the length of time 
served, the case has two other interesting 
features. First, the deceased had not, in 
fact, been murdered at all. This contrasts 
with many other cases, such as those of 
the Gui/j/orJ /bur, the Mrmin^/iam &, 
bun^ and more recently Aju/ 
, referred to above. In these cases, 
it was beyond dispute that the deceased 
had been murdered: the pubs in 
Guildford and Birmingham were indeed 
bombed and the schoolgirl was certainly 
murdered. The only question was who 
was responsible. In the case of Nicholls, 
however, it transpired that the woman's 
heart attack was from entirely natural 
causes. Records, which had been \\ithheld 
not only from the defence but from the 
prosecuting counsel as well, showed that 
she had suffered from a heart complaint 
for some time. Further new forensic 
evidence also showed that the head 
injuries were caused by a fall downstairs. 
The Court of Appeal made its view of the 
case abundantly clear: not only did the 
judges apologise to Nicholls for the time 
he had spent in prison, but they described 
the work of the original pathologists as 
'inadequate, inappropriate and grossly 
misleading'.
The second interesting point is the 
standpoint adopted by the police officer 
in charge of the case. He made it clear 
from the start that he believed that 
Nicholls was innocent. He had therefore 
frequently visited Nicholls throughout his 
23 years in prison and accompanied him 
at the press conference to celebrate the 
overturning of his conviction.
A final point regards appeals after the 
accused has died. Where the new 
evidence only comes to light after some 
considerable time, it can of course 
happen that by then the accused is dead. 
This does not preclude an appeal. It may 
perhaps seem a little pointless to seek to 
overturn a conviction once the defendant 
is dead   after all, it is too late to release 
them from prison. It can, however, be of 
great importance to the accused's family 
A notable example concerned the case of 
Bentley, who was convicted and, despite a 
jury recommendation of mercy, executed
in the 1950s for the murder of a police 
officer. The facts of the case are 
sufficiently well known for it not to be 
necessary to repeat them here, although 
it is perhaps worth recalling that 
Bentley's accomplice, Craig, who actually 
fired the shot, escaped the hangman's 
noose through being only 17 years old.
Bentley's execution rather appeared to 
be the end of the matter, but his sister, 
Iris, began a persistent campaign to clear 
her brother's name, ideally through a 
quashing of his conviction or through a 
pardon by the Queen. Eventually she 
succeeded.
The current law on the subject is 
found in s. 44A of the 1968 Act (inserted 
by the 1995 Act). This states that, where 
the defendant is dead, an appeal may be 
brought or continued if he died part way 
through the appeal process by 'a person 
approved by the Court of Appeal'. Such 
approval is normally given either to the 
defendant's widow or widower or to the 
executor of his will. It may also be given, 
however, to 'any other person appearing 
to the Court of Appeal to have, by reason 
of a family or similar relationship with 
the dead person, a substantial financial or 
other interest in the determination of a 
relevant appeal relating to them'. 
Bentley's sister would come into this 
latter category. Under s. 44A(4), 
approval may not be given more than one 
vcar after the defendant's death unless 
the appeal is begun by a reference by the 
Criminal Cases Review Commission.
REMEDIES
Once the Court of Appeal overturns a 
conviction, two remedies are available. In 
either case, the conviction is quashed. In 
some cases, this simply means a 
substitution of a verdict of not guilty and 
the accused is released. This is what 
happened in the case of the Gui/J/orJ four. 
This is then the end of the matter. Until 
1996, the court did have the power, 
where it accepted that the conviction was 
wrong (usually because of a defect in the 
trial procedure) but felt nonetheless that 
no miscarriage of justice had occurred, to 
refuse to quash the conviction. Under the 
1995 Act, this has been abolished: if the 
conviction is unsafe, it is to be quashed.
The court does, however, have the 
power, which is frequently exercised, to 
quash the conviction, but then order a 
retrial. The power is set out in s. 7(1) of 
the 1968 Act: 21
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'Where the Court of Appeal allow an appeal 
aaainst conviction ... and it appears to the 
Court that the interests oj justice so require, 
they may order the appellant to he retried. '
In this respect, it may be likened to the 
cour dc cassation in the French system.
Such retrial must, however, take place 
within two months. Once this period has 
expired the retrial may only take place 
with the leave of the Court of Appeal, and 
the defendant may in such circumstances 
applv tor the retrial order to be set aside.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it may be seen that a 
detailed system is available for putting 
right miscarriages of justice. The accused 
may bring an appeal against the 
conviction or, where he or she is dead, 
the family may clear the accused's name 
by bringing it on his or her behalf. In 
addition, the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission may refer the case to the 
Court of Appeal and has extensive 
powers of investigation to support such a 
reference. It will not prevent miscarriages
of justice occurring in the first place but 
it does at least mean that a remedy is 
available where thev do. ©
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